These aren't actually fixes for the contact.php itself, just clean-ups for malicious content that was added to sites before they ran the v0.7.22 update to contact.php etc.?
They have been hit really hard: where normally I see 10 registered users at a max and as many robots/visitors, yesterday the total concurrent visit count exploded to a 200+
Not one file was added or modified (I CRC'd my site just before the attack started).
Finally, I redirected the access for contact.php and help_us.php "somewhere else".
I tried to check the apache web access log file to see what these bots where doing, but its size was way to big ^^
On an affected (0.7.19) site I cleaned all kinds off dynamic link folders with names like 1.txt, 2.txt, 3.txt In the e107_files/cache I found phpinfo.php In the root I found comeon.php, m22.php and u.php. Make sure you get rid of these too!
I considered it a fix because I had read elsewhere that some sites with v.7.22 had also had a problem. I don't know if they may have been hit before the upgrade, but until the dust settles I needed to remove the problem.
I was attacked a few years ago on one site for another reason. I'm still not sure how they got in, but I think it may have just been someone broke a password that was too simple.
Anyway, I "thought" I had cleaned up, but a few months later I was attacked again.
If you read about this current specific exploit, the problem lies with certain web server software as well as e107's contact.php form page.
Here's a few other things I would recommend if you have been compromised whether via the CMS or via the server.
1. Change your Hosting accounts password AND FTP passwords if different.
2. Change your mySQL password and the file that holds that information. (I changed my mySQL database name as well).
3. Change all Admins Passwords.
4. Check admins email addresses to be sure they are correct.
You may also want to change email passwords as well.
It may be overkill. It can be a lot of work. But it may save some work in the future. Once I did all this, and kept the site up-to-date, things are good.
Here are some of the IP's part of this attack: 213.17.153.11 75.125.205.82 195.199.243.114 204.10.38.244 193.226.30.130 91.199.120.11 212.227.118.21 195.249.40.23 78.138.88.234 79.14.43.2 84.247.49.62 212.227.118.21 87.229.24.67 206.174.210.10 85.94.197.34 87.210.197.1
I thought I was going crazy yesterday with my server and mysql dying on me the whole time. Reading this post this morning explained a lot to me.
There is a script running trying to access: "contact.php and help_us.php"
A quick fix would be for server admins to check apache logs and just firewall the IP's that attempt to connect to "help_us.php".
None of my sites have been compromised and I'm running various versions of e107... Only I am experiencing DDoS like activity.
e107 should have a way to change the default folders name (e107_plugin, e107_handlers...etc). This way security would improve. I have donenthis.
AS I´ve informed e107 security team, I have mod security in Apache, and it prevent some of the attacks, which were logged.
Some of the files were -e107_handlers/secure_img_render.php -fpw.php -e107_plugins/content/handlers/content_class.php -e107_plugins/content/handlers/content_convert_class.php
for security sake I didn´t write the all query they tried to execute, but on a second though here is all the query from one of them (they were all the same) so your can check they are trying to upload a gif
Are you sure this is the same attack? Seems like different files than what the contact.php attack is about.
I did some ip lookups to see where they are. If you are sure they are the source, and not just infected systems, you could do a whois to find out who to report the abuse to maybe? In case it's an account, not an owner.
Name sabotaj Status REGISTERED (What this means) How to dispute this registration Registered October 8, 2009 Last update October 8, 2009, 5:15 pm Registrant Name ENES OKTAR Organisation None Language English Address Atyk Veysel Cad 28/1 daire/9 06290 ankara ankara-kacioren Germany +49 05073466556 Email "rocco-tie@msn. com" Email "domain.manager @publicdomainregistry.com" Registrar technical contacts Name Domain Manager Organisation "PublicDomainRegistry .com" Language English Address
14525 SW Milliken #48732 97005-2343 Beaverton Oregon United States
Main script file is ooo.php which contains all the code for backdoor installation of other scriots and connect to server etc. Huge one as I was browsing through it. Two tgz files contain the same script in compressed form. .config.ini.php seems to be empty redirecting file. The command that was logged in webserver are as follows
Mon Jun 7 03:33:37 2010: '/usr/bin/php /home/***/public_html/***/.config.ini.php ' (Exe: php [/usr/bin/php], Script: '/home/****/public_html.***/.config.ini.php', Domain: ***, Request: '/.config.ini.php?act=phptools&host=89.188.136.25&time=120&port=53&type=udp', Accessed from: 217.23.14.79) - of ****** has used 101.6 %CPU
All commands are in same format with same ip numbers.
e107 version was 0.7.17
I had updated main site to .22 but failed to update another one. Main site is ok but this one came under ddos attack. Though it was not production site as yet so no harm.
I have saved ooo.php file. If devs want to look at may be I can send it . It contains fully configured irc trojan. File searching, automated recursive dir , full mysql functions and connect to port 6667 , sends mail etc. It contains following info
oded by Enqu!nx & TurkTegin /* MAIL http://sabotaj. eu , http://sabotaj. eu
I don't know how this file or compressed files were uploaded as FTP seems intact.
Now I have deleted all files and fresh install for site .22 ver has been done. Will request admin to reactivate the site.